On words and classifying reality: islamofascism distracts

Mark has written a thoughtful post on whyislamofascism is completely wrong to describe the current radicalism that afflicts Islam. I concour with him that fascism is the totally wrong category to name the phenomenon. I'm not better because I use the term islamojihadism but that's a litote

Jihad is the foundation of Islam; without it, the religion is unreasonable hodgepodge of Christian heresies, some Jewish traditions, Arab paganism and an utterly childish mythology. Jihad provides a rationale for the killing, lying, stealing and forcibly converting non-Moslem population. Islamic theology since the beginning has been immune to apologetics, reasoned debates or persuasion- just ask St Francis of Assisi.

Indeed, it's quite significant that for such a fissipourous religion, jihad is the one common, unchanging characteristic that still unites the Moslems whether they're Sunni, Sh'ia or even Sufi. So we need to call the phenomomeon by its name: jihad; the practioners of jihad, the mujehadin.Once we've correctly named the phenomenon, it'll be much easier to study it and to destroy it.

Jihad is much more brittle than everyone cares to admit. It's not just countering it with corecitive policies through the police and military but also the ideological and religious. Islam is an inferior religion to Christanity and the former's civilization is completely unimpressive in contrast to the West. So let's get our moral foundations in order and a revitalized, moral West will finish jihad forever.

On guerillas, conventional armies and victory

Serge cites an article from a Lew Rockwell contribiutor. The authour claims that in the last century, guerillas have won significant victories over conventional militaries. That's inaccurate.

If guerillas have defeated a conventional army it was because the former received material support and sanctuary from an adjoining state. If the guerillas didn't have such advantages, they were crushed. Another factor was that the politicians/citizens put unusual restraints on the conduct of the war. Let me give you a classical example of each factor: Malaysia and Vietnam.

It's interesting to note that the Malyasian war (the Brits called it euphemastically the Emergency) and the Indochina war started almost simultaneously. The British won against the Malaysian communist party. Why? First, the Malaysian communists were isolated, they had no adjoining communist state that would pour supplies and provide sanctuary. So the communists so couldn't lick their wounds in a sovereign country and couldn't make up the loss of arms and equipment.

Second, the British were determined to win and undertook many imaginative steps to prevent support to the communists from spreading. In Indochina, the Viet communists had China to supply them. And they did, even supplying the Viets with the latest American weaponry captured during the Korean war.

Although the Viet communist party didn't hide in China, they had a potential sanctuary. The French were hapless in their war efforts. They didn't have the resources, and more importantly, the citizens were deeply ambivalent about the conflict. So the politicians reflected that ambivalence and thus swung from abandoning Indochina to its fate to determinedly wiping out the communists. Later on when the Americans took over the Vietnam conflict, they uncharacteristically restrained themselves in their war effort. For example, how come Lyndon Johnson never asked the Joint chiefs if they had an invasion plan for North Vietnam and at least discuss it?

Further, the Americans allowed the Vietcong to hide in sovereign countries which eventually necessitated an invasion which failed.

The case of Iraq is similar. There are adjoining countries that act as conduits for Moslem foreigners to come as well as for resupply. Understandably the Coalition can't exactly invade Iran or Syria no matter how brazenly they support the foreign and domestic fighters in public and crow about it in public. The Taliban in Afganistan aren't very successful either but they abscond to Pakistan when the fighting becomes too intense and need to lick their wounds. Again NATO can't exactly invade those regions because juridically they're Pakistani territory even if the reality is otherwise. And there are other prudential political considerations to take into account.

I conclude that guerillas only win against conventional armies when the former have adjoining states that support them with weapons, matériel even personnel and provide the guerilla with sanctuary on their territories which inhibits the conventional army from invading due to reasonable legal-political cosndierations. If a guerilla force doesn't have these advantages, it'll be defeated and wiped out.