Just wanted my readers to know that I'm gone on Sunday and should return Tuesday, blogging will resume on Wednesday
James Bennett and Iain Murray have posted their critique of my article
Many thanks for their critique. I admit that I'm a bit chagrined to have followed Kipling's White man burden theory and deeply dismayed when James points out that I've articulated the American State Department's and the pro-European Tories faction's positions on the subject.
I must admit that I was discouraged because I had no intention to parrot anyone; I simply wanted to advance, erroniously as it turns out, was a moderate position. I'm growing increasingly alarmed by the estrangement between Britian and the European Union. The serious rows between both is in neither's interests. I fear that the Union might retaliate with a neo-Continental system that would be totally couterproductive. Nevertheless, I understand Iain's critique of this perspective. It's simply not in Britian's best interest to seek closer ties with the Union; the former simply can't prevent the growing authoritarianism of the latter. There's no political will in Brussels or any other European capital. I underestimated the role that national and Unionist interest as well political resolve have in European politics. Nevertheless, what about the regions?
The European regions could play an important role in tempering the Union's centralist and statist tendencies. I should've been far more explicit and included the European regions as potential allies to more extensive British participation in the Union when I turned my attention to the civil society. Indeed, the very notion of network commonwealths could present political opportunities that had hithertofor been unclear or unnoticed. As James reminded me, the advantage of network commonwealths is that they need not be limited by geography. All in all, Iain and James' critiques have been most instructive in exposing the flaws in my arguments and the inadequacy of my analyses. I have much to reflect.
Over the years, many pundits, columnists and bloggers have articulated reasonable and cogent arguments against British membership in the European Union. By contrast, very few have advanced arguments in favour of British membership. This monograph will advance those argument in favour of British adherence to the Union but limits them to three principal areas: federalism, economics and civil society.
To be perfectly forthright, I care very little if I advance are hetrodoxic, controversial or shocking. Too much of what I read smack of a sourness that Britian no longer has the political and economic influence to prevent European unification as in the past. Further the British ambivalence towards the European Union risks antagonizing its members and potentially realizing Britian's fear of a neo-Continental System. Nevertheless, Europe needs Britian as much as the the latter the former. Britian's adherence to the Union would challenge the statist, centralist and bureaucratic consensus in the latter's consolidation.
The European Union is betraying its federalist principles in order to embrace a centralist, statist, indeed jacobin political culture. The Eurocrats mistakenly presume that to create a European identity, decentralization and respect for local autonomy are hinderances rather than assets. Unfortuantely for the Europeans, they are substituting national centralism with a supranational one. European federalist principles emphasizing local autonomy, decentralization and respect for regional cultures have never prospered robustly during the 3 centuries of national centralism and those principles risk being totally subsumed by the new European centralist tradition.
By contrast, federalism in British political culture is a recessive trait that become dominant when the British go abroad. We only need to survey its largest ex-colonies, Canada, Australia, the United States and India are federations. By and large, they are successful as political regimes and satisfy their citizens' aspirations. To praise British federalism is not to romanticize it; nevertheless, the fact that the British federalist tradition has thrived in demanding conditions in new continenets that never experienced British political culture, gives confidence that British federalism would succced in Europe.
British membership in the European Union would temper its centralism, statism and bureaucratism by introducing subsidary political values: external oversight, accountability and responsible government. Moreover, Britian could act as a 'regional' country and energize the regions to demand that the European Union respect subsidarity and not intervene in areas that are best left to the local authourities. Finally Englans'd presence in the Union would give greater credibility to a more decentralized political regime- that Europe will succeed when it's a mosaic of regions, countries and blocs of localities much like the Roman Empire at its height or the Empire of Charles V of Spain. To decentralize is to show sufficent confidence in one's political institutions that to delegate authourity locally.Suich delegations demonstrates that the central authourity has nothing to fear from the localities.
The European economies have a strong statist element. The European Union is merely continuing those national policies. It's easy for the anti-Unionist Anglophiles to scorn the European penchant to use the state to stimulate their development. Nonetheless, such scorn is unfair. It mustn't be forgotten that many European states industralized at a much later date than Britian. Late industralization is more complex and capital-intensive than the British industrial revolution; also, the industralizing European countrie not only had to develop their industries but had to compete against Britisn which was the greatest industrial and economic power for many centuries. There was no reasonable alternative to avoid teh state. Indeed most citizens enthusistically supported the state's intervention. Where the British, and European pro-market, commentators have a legitmate point is that there are moments when the state bceomes an obstacle not a stimulus for further industralization. Determining when the state becomes problematic is unclear but there are ways of find out.
It's reasonable to state that the contemporary Europan Union's developmental policies are too statist and too interventionist. Britian's membership in the European Union would call into question the inertial tendency to rely on the state. True, Britian would find it a challenge to convince reticent Europeans that a less rigid market economy with more flexible legislation with respect to labour, capital formation fiscal policy and social policies is as effective in foster solidatity and concértation that they so crave. It's fair to say that Europe has never really implemented market-oriented capitalism.British membership would at least spur the European Union to give market-oriented capitalism a try if only to disprove 'neo-liberalism'
European civil society has historically been more limited than its British counterpart. Especially so in influencing politics. Nonetheless, the various institutions and entities that currently exist in the European Union are particularly robust, their main weakness is that they still look too much to the state for legitimacy and for financial support. British membership in the European Union would stimulate the European civil society to look less towards the state for affirmation and towards fellow citizens to assocate and advocate common issues of interest. One of the strengths of British civil society is its civic volunteerism. The European civil society would benefit immensly from the beneficial effects of civic volunteerism. Once again the Union's statist, centralist and legalistic tendencies would be tempered through an infinite multitude of civic entities vying for its attention or shame.
The British objection to membership in the European Union are legitimate. Nevertheless, it's in Britian's interest to be a member than to be outside if it wishes to temper the Union's statist, centralist, legalist and bureaucratic political culture. The suspicions between the Europeans and the anti-Unionist British are both counterproductive and unjustified. Britian and Europe would benefit with the former's membership. Together, they would make the European Union be a positive entity in world affairs.
Aquest demati, he escrit un article en anglès sobre la guerra del '98 on els americans intervingueren en favor dels independentistes. Papa i jo sempre discutem si el espanyols i els colonialistes haguéssin concertat un accord abans de l'intervenció americana. papa opina que no. Que ja era massa tard i els governs successius s'en mostrat massa podrits per sortir-se'n amb un modus vivideni.
Potser sí papa té molta raó;però al mateix temps, els independentistes perdien la guerra i sense la mala sort de l'explosió del Maine, suspito que els espanyols haurien gaunyat la guerra però haguéssin d'haver fetes algunes concessions si més no per evitar un nou escalatament més tard al futur. El desfet d'Espanya a la Guerra del '98 havia tingunt unes conseqüències nefestes per el país com per a Catalunya. La politíca esdevengué absoluta i intransigent. Doncs, tot compromís n'era impossble car per un cantó de compremetre-se per que això significaria una pert insignificant que sigui. Mira, la dificultat pel catalanisme d'arrancar quansevulla delgació de poder del centre fins la IIa República, l'impossibilitat de legisferar les reformes de les terres en Andulusia, incapacitat del reformistes i els conservadors de cedir un pas sobre els temes del dia enacra que sigui al millor interès del país. Tothom avava a la seva.
Llavors ja es traçava la linia recta que conduiria cap a la Guerra civil espanyola.
Tot per que els americans volien un imperi ràpid i sense suor de bastir un propri. La tragèdia es que els americans no en calien un.
Aquest demati, he escrit un article en anglès sobre la guerra del '98 on els americans intervingueren en favor dels independentistes. Papa i jo sempre discutem si el espanyols i els colonialistes haguéssin concertat un accord abans de l'intervenció americana. papa opina que no. Que ja era massa tard i els governs successius s'en mostrat massa podrits per sortir-se'n amb un modus vivideni.
Potser sí papa té molta raó;però al mateix temps, els independentistes perdien la guerra i sense la mala sort de l'explosió del Maine, suspito que els espanyols haurien gaunyat la guerra però haguéssin d'haver fetes algunes concessions si més no per evitar un nou escalatament més tard al futur. El desfet d'Espanya a la Guerra del '98 havia tingunt unes conseqüències nefestes per el país com per a Catalunya. La politíca esdevengué absoluta i intransigent. Doncs, tot compromís n'era impossble car per un cantó de compremetre-se per que això significaria una pert insignificant que sigui. Mira, la dificultat pel catalanisme d'arrancar quansevulla delgació de poder del centre fins la IIa República, l'impossibilitat de legisferar les reformes de les terres en Andulusia, incapacitat del reformistes i els conservadors de cedir un pas sobre els temes del dia enacra que sigui al millor interès del país. Tothom avava a la seva.
Llavors ja es traçava la linia recta que conduiria cap a la Guerra civil espanyola.
Tot per que els americans volien un imperi ràpid i sense suor de bastir un propri. La tragèdia es que els americans no en calien un.
Yesterday, I came across a thoughtful post by Christopher Johnson of the Midwest conversative journal analyzing Kristoff's article about American expanison to the Midwest. I contacted Christopher and pointed out to him that I disagreed with Kristoff. The America's mistake was the Mexican-American war. That Santa Anna was a despotic, coked out- he was an opium addict- meglomanic tyrant is indisputable but let's leave aside the Disneyfication of the Alamo- it was a rebellion and the Mexicans did have a legitimate right to put it down. Sadly, Santa Anna is one of those personalities that where he could've shown a calculated mercy, he chose gratuitious brutality.
In any case, Charles commented on my reflections and then I thought of another time when American expansionism was both gratuitious and deeply disturbing: the Spanish American war.
To me it's pretty obvious that the Americans wanted an empire and discovered that Cuba was close enough and Spain weak enough to wrest the island from the latter. Cuba had been fighting Spain partly over accumulated greivences and a confused desire to be independent. The Spanish army was slowly winning the war to the point that both sides would've negotiated some sort of settlement. American intervention cynically exploitated by the Maine explosion, not only metamorphisized the strategic balance permenantly in favour of the independence forces but had a devastating effect on Spain when it was defeated.
If there's one thing that you immediately pick up in reading the Spanish intelligensia of the Generación '98 is that the society is a fuck up. No matter what the state or the society did, it was going to fail and do so spectacularly, unequivocally. Consequently politics become absolutist and intransigent. No compromise was possible nor desired. That attitude set Spain towards its Civil war: it was either the reformers or the conservatives that would prevail. It wasn't until 1975, that all sides finally worked out a modus vivendi that's held.
Americans should ask themselves if they ran the Phillipines, Cuba and Puerto Rico any better than Spain. My view is no. Cuba is under the throes of one of the most brutal, despotic, bloody, meglomanic tyrannies in history; the Phillipines is politically bizarre- a patina of American derived institutions badly fitted to 4 centuries of Spanish colonization- as well as an economic basket case (true the Japanese occupation, robbery and American liberation destroyed the island but what did the Americans do from 1898-1941?) and Puerto Rico, less than a state more than a colony.
In conclusion, America could've still catapulted itself on the world state as a major power without the need of the Spanish American war.
My girlfriend Trina asked me an interesting question over the weekend about martial roles over time. She wonders if the changes in realtions between husband and wife are based on perception or something else.
I don't have any definitive answers on the subject but I've mused on the topic for some time and here are my thoughts.
The roles are based on simple obserbvations: guys are usually stronger and taller than women; while women give birth to babies. These observations later lead the collectivity- the family, the clan, the tribe to ritualize these observable differences into the symbolic. I suppose it's a way ro give order or to organize the collective's guiding principles.
Most societies prety much followed the rituals without much questioning . A change occured with the rise of critical inquiry in the Greek mainland in the 8 century BC. From then on, everything was scrutinized including martial roles. Once the roles of husband and wife were studied and debated, there's been a perennial back and forth between those that want to restrict a wife's role (and thus by extension the women's in the larger society) and those that want a more expansive role equal to men's. I wouldn't be surprised if couple themselves discreetly, quietly and informally worked out their own roles withing the limit of the collectivity's tolerance for tampering with 'nature.'
In the West, since the adoption of Christanity, the back and forth has been quiet intense at times. However, I'd argue that over the long run, the the trend has been- and remains- to prefer expanding the wife's role to be equal to the husband's. Frankly, how the martial roles evolve in the future depends on many factors from the women's own atitude to disasters that could befall society.
Prof Glenn a cité cet article de Nelson Ascher du rôle des institutions culturelles étatiques comme une façon de faire de la propagande et influencer des pais. C'est vrai que les Européens cultivent les écrivants Asiatiques, africain et Latinoaméricans en les invitent aux pays pour donner des conférences, en décernant de prix littéaires et en publicant ou diffusant leurs travaux. Bref les Européens les prendent au sérieux et récompense les talent de ces artistes et écrivains étrangers.
Par contraste, les Américans n'ont pas cette tradition, et depuis les dernières vigntaine d'années, cette cultivation des écrivains, artistes étranger se rarifient d'autant plus pusique les Américans se sont devenu provinicaux. ce n'est pas seulment moi qui lamente cet étroissement d'esprits. Jean-François Revel, que nul ne peut accuser d'anti-américanisme, se plaint du même phènomene dans son article «Le péril suprême:Disneyland» dans Fin du siècle
Une partie du problème réside au fait que les institutions d'enesignement américianes ont abdiqué dans leur tâche d'enseigner les enfants. Une autre problème c'est que la société américane décourage l'apprentissage des langues étrangère- on voit les conséquence de ce désintéressement dans la lutte contre l'islamisme intégriste où ni le CIA ni les forces armées américans disposaient assez de personnel qui parlaient et entendaient le pastoun etc.
Le dernier facteur c'est la vitalité de la culture populaire américaine. Elle est si vigoureuse qu'elle donne une fausse impréssion que le monde veut imiter l'Amérique ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas
I enjoy reading Den Beste; however, whenever he talks about the American military and its equipment, I get profoundly annoyed and some correctives are in order. A case in point is this article I generally agree with his assessment until he states that American military equipment is the best. The assertion is debatable.
The American military industry doesn't have a monopoly on excellence. I'd argue that the Leopard II is just as comparable to the Abrams. In fact, if you take a good look at those non-Western countries, that can afford to buy high quality weapons, they tend to buy a mix of American and Allied equipment.
If there's one thing that I despise about the American military is its smugness in refusing to adopt NATO or Allied military equipment until the 80s. Indeed, their outlook was that Lend-Lease was still in effect and the European allies' sole obligation was to shut up and acritically buy American equipment. A classical case is the competition between the Leopard II and Abrams prototypes in the late 70s.
In 1973, the Americans quite sensibly were pushing for standardized tank components as a more efficient way to lessen the logistical. The German government arrived at the logical conclusion and proposed that both countries adopt a common tank. Steven Zaloga states that the American military leaders were dismayed Michael Jerchel, for his part, argues in his booklet that the American military never had any intention of ever adopting the Leopard II. They just went through the motions to please Congress so as not to jeopardize the selection of the Abrams. In fact, one of the reasons that the Abrams tank is so good is because the American engineers ripped off some of the German prototypes' technology.
Sure the American and Germans signed a memorandum of understanding that the Rheinmetall 120 mm tank cannon would be incorporated into future versions of the Abrams as well standarization of the major tank components but it was still a sop to outraged ally.
It wasn't the first time that the American military rejected European arms. Already at the founding of NATO there was a very controversial debate for a standard rifle and calibre. The Europeans- with the exception of the British- wanted to adopted to adopt the FN FAL rifle in an intermediate cartidge, like 7,92 kurz developed for the MP 44 assault rifle, or 7 mm. The Americans were stubborn and wanted NATO to adopt the 7,62x51 mm (the WW II ,30 calibre cartidge was 7,62x63 mm. Thank to advances in propellant technology, the Americans were able to reduce the calibre's length)The Europeans refused because the American justifications for the new rifle bullet were directly contradicted by the very recent wartime experiences with the MP 44 and the STG 45, an improved version of the MP 44. The Europeans wanted the Americans to adopt the FN rifle. There was even an American prototype (the Springfield T 44) but the military rejected and in fact wanted to sell the Europeans the M-14 rifle, basically a modernized WW II Garand! So NATO's quest for standard rifle fell through. Yet what was particularly galling was that no sooner that NATO adopted the 7,62 mm cartridge in 1954; by 1957, the American arms designers were working on a new rifle cartidge that would become the 5,56 mm. No doubt the feverish redesign was spurred on by captured examples of the SKS rifle chambered for the news 7,62x 39 mm that the British and French brought back from the Suez
So 12 years after the Second World war and the interminable debates witin NATO over the appropriate rifle cartridge to adopt, the Americans realize that they were wrong; yet, in typical fashion, they went to the other extreme.
Tom Clancy on his book Special Forces points out that the 5,56mm bullets fire 'light'. In practical terms, 5,56 mm bullets can't penetrate sandbags! One proposed solution is to have sabot discarding bullets. Basically these would be similar in design to the depleted uranium tank shells that NATO uses but without that substance.
By the time of Regean's military build up the closed American military market was causing severe strains within the alliance. Yet the Europeans had allies within the American Congress. Many members were fed up with the military industry's goldplated weapons that took decades to produce and were frankly mediocre. The Congressmen also wanted to control costs, restore competition and assuage furious NATO Allies; so they decided to lay down the law to the American military via legislation that obliged them to buy NATO/Allied equipment. The effects have been excellent: The American military finally adopted Allied military equipment that has become popular with the soldiers, such as the Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) and competition has been restored within the American military equipment market.
To reiterate, the American military industries do make excellent weapons and equipment but they don't own a monopoly on excellence.