Yesterday, James Bennett informed me that he wrote his response to mypolemic I'm deeply grateful to James as he's cleared up some misconceptions and misreadings of his original article on my part.
We corresponded after I read in diagonal, as the French say, his essay and we both agreed that we'd continue the debate. In fact, I downloaded the essay to read it more serenely as I want to digest more fully his rebuttal and write a response to it. I only ask my readers and those James to be patient. I have a very vague idea of what subjects I want to cover and how I would like to organize my thoughts.
I read through Eve's visit to the Imperial War museum where she reflects on war and other things. She then asks how WW I came about.
Well, unlike John Keegan who's reluctant to articulate any reasons as to what
caused the First World War, I will (hey I'm young and foolish and je m'adventurerai as I'd say in French). Hopefully Eve will find them interesting point of departure.
Here's my list:
Personalism in European international affairs.
Bismarck made himself indispensable to European politics. It was he who created and
manipulated many of the alliances and secret treaties during the second half of the
19th century. Unfortunately for him and for Europe, he thought he was
irreplaceable and didn't think of the consequences of what would happen if someone less skilful
than he took over the alliance system. That's exactly what happened when Wilhem II took the throne and dismissed Bismarck. Wilhelm wasn't as deft as Bismarck and the former managed to antagonize just about everyone in Europe, Hence the first cause of the First World war was the total absence of any institutional mechanisms which didn't depend on one person. This is one lesson the European learnt very well as today there are so many bewildering array and overlapping institutions of all kinds in European Union
Impersonalism in the mobilization system
Parallel to the personalism in international affairs, the mobilization system in Europe was impersonal. The mobilization system as it evolved in the post Napoleonic wars, made it impossible for an individual or a group of people to order a halt in mobilization. At the root of this rigidity was the train timetable; for the French it was a lesson burnt into them by their defeat during the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71 when the trains were sent to the wrong place and the troops
couldn't be transported to the battlefield. Indeed, Keegan blasts Wilhem II and the other European leaders for not grasping the complexity of their respective mobilization systems and that once activated, war was inevitable. Again the Soviets and the Americans learnt that lesson and incorporated the famous hotline telephone system so that the leaders could at least communicate with each other during a crises.
German and French frustrations
The frustrations weren't for the same reasons. The Germans were frustrated at what they perceived to be the British and French denial of an empire which the former thought was their right.
Thus, Wilhem II started to engage in provocative acts like building a navy that would
compete with the British and aggravating crises like the Morocco situation in the early 1900s.
Unfortunately, the Germans didn't really need an empire, they were widely successful in business:
they sold all over the world and their products were highly sought after. If Wilhem didn't have
such a militaristic mind set and the Germans so obtuse with gaining an empire at any cost,
Germany would be what the U.S. is today: a dominant country influential in all fields.
The French nursed a different kind of grudge: the loss of Alsace-Lorraine due to their defeat in the Franco-Prussian war.
As long as Bismarck was in power, France was pretty isolated and no one much cared about its whining. After Bismarck, the British, French and Russians sufficiently feared German policies that they put aside their differences and created the Entente
The British would literally support one of France political aims which would be the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine.
That treaty was one of the worst things to happen to Germany. In case of a war Germany would have to fight a 2 front war which is what happened.
The ideological factors: why was everyone so enthusiastic?
That's perhaps the hardest question to answer. I think it was the delusion brought about by nearly
a century of general peace since the Napoleonic wars fostered (sure there were conflicts in Europe but they were small, lasted a short time and didn't cause extensive damage throughout thecontinent).
Consequently, people thought that what would be the First World war would last at most 8 weeks. The enthusiasm that occurred in the first weeks of the war, I think was due to the optimism fostered by the success of the continental nation state in advancing industrialization, education as well the hubris brought by great advances in sciences. People thought they could conquer anything.
Yet another factor that led to the war European generals' refusal to absorb the lessons of the new
military revolution that industrialization brought about.
The European generals observed the American civil war but they didn't seem to learn anything from that conflict or incorporate them
into their training. After all, the Europeans didn't consider America to be a serious nation at the
time. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 didn't make much of an impact either except for the importance of entrenchments.
In sum, the generals didn't bother to learn the lessons of previous war nor interest themselves about how industrialization changed their professions.
It's as if the generals concluded that the Napoleonic style warfare represented the 'end of military history' and deigned to incorporate a few technological innovations like the train, the breech loading, and later, bolt action rifle and the machine gun. Yet the underlying foundations hadn't really changed at all.
Even during World War I, it took 3 years of pointless slaughter before the Allied generals decided to try the tank to resolve the dilemma of trench warfare.
Contrary to Fawaz Turki's histrionics, the controversy over the Qur'an isn't some protypical anti-Islamic animus. Rather it's the way that it's presented at the university which exposes a double-standard. The secularists have done everything in their power to ban any obligatory presentation of Christanity in the American educational system; yet suddenly, it's OK to study the Qu'ran? The laws either apply equally or they don't an exception must be justified.
Further, the edition of the Qur'an is incomplete as it leaves out the controversial verses about the 'infidels' and violence that cen be done to them if they refuse to accept Mohammed as his prophet. Students, particularly at the university level, should have access to a complete version of any holy book. In order to appreciate the influence that such books have, the students must be exposed to the beauty, the ugliness, the obscure, the boring and even the controversial if they're to appreciate why a religion has the influence and adherence of its faithful.
Surely even Turki would concede as much.
I'm frankly tired of hearing about how the Arab/Moselms prepared the way for the Renaissance. They did not. They preserved and transmitted some of the Greek science and philisophy to the West but it was the latter which synthesized the various threads and made science its own. The West owes nothing to Islamic civilization in the recuperation of its cultural heritage. The Arabs/Moselms did not help us recuperate Aristophanes, nor did they really care about the Classical world's architecture, nor did they influence us in our paintings or sculture.
Hell even the Alaric King of the Visigoths had the Timateus read to him in Greek! when he conquered Athens! An attitude that in the 1400 years of Islamic civilization, no Moselm never, ever demonstrated. Culturally we owe more to the Carlomagnian and Cisterian reforms than we do to various Caliphites.
And one last thing, the Iberian peninsula wasn't the only place where the 3 Abrahamic religions exchanged ideas and stuff, there was also the Two Sicilies. Roger in particular got into a lot of trouble with the papacy because of his close relationship with the Arabs in his realm as well as inviting prominent Arab/Islamic scholars to exchange ideas and scholarship.
Arabnews en su editorial pregunta por que los antriores presidentes no habian declarado un estado de excepción contra la FARC. Bueno, es obvío que los redactores cuentan a la ignorancia del saudí ordinario para haber sollevado esta pregunta.
Es muy sencillo- en el caso de Pastaran su plataforma electoral hace 5 años era de negociar con la FARC. Hasta concedió un terreno equivalente a Suiza. Desafortunadamente por Pastrana la FARC utilizó la truega así como el terreno para regrupar. Los ataques bajo la truega demonstraon rotundamente la mala fe del lidergazo de la FARC. Los ataques multiplicaron, los secuestros estafaba la clase media etc. La gente se hartó y querría un replique mucho mas rebusto algo que dañaria a la FARC.
El editorial lamenta por que la Administración estadaunidense no considera el narcotràfico como terrorismo- los integrantes de la Administración siempre le han considerado como tal y han ortogado 2 mil milliones$ U.S. para financar el Plan Colombia 2000. Ha sido muy contravertida esta financación tanto dentro como fuera de país. Sin embargo, la razón por que los norteaméricanos no han intervenido mas abiertamente como en Afganistan es por que el Estado columbiano y la socidad civil muestre el comprimismo de combatir el narcotràfico y la FARC (que son dos caras de la misma medalla). Además, en contraste con Al Qua'ida y los demás terroristas integrists islamistas, La FARC se ancora en la realidad y ha tenido el buen sentido de nunca ataquear directament los EE UU. De actuar así el lidergazo de la FARC se suicidaría y lo saben. La FARC prefiere subvertir los EE UU vendiendo la coca y utilizar los beneficios del narcotràfico para comprara las armas para destruir el Estado columbiano y sustituir un etado narcosocialista
One thing that we will never hear Bush tell the American public is that going into Baghdad, with population of over six million, we will surly be sending the young soldiers into the death trap that will be set up by the Iraqi people. Feeling that they must fight to defend them selves, they will fight to the end. Lets not forget that in their minds it is the American government that has caused the death of one and a half million innocent Iraqi due to the embargo that has been placed on them for over eleven years. When Bush, Sr., the war in 1991, it was not because he loved Iraqi people, but rather he knew that the Iraqi government had distributed a great deal of weapons to its citizens in case the Americans would try to invade the Baghdad and Bush did not want to take that chance. This was a fact and my wife, a recent immigrant from Iraq, had witnessed such actions.
She told me that the government of Iraq has found a way to protect its city and people by distributing weapons to each and every home in the city. The Iraqi citizens referred to this possible invasion of the city as: Inzal, meaning: The drop. This was short title used to for the meaning of: whenever the American parachutes down to the city, that the Iraqi citizens would fire at the American soldiers before hitting the ground. That is a very scary scenario and I would not want ONE single young American to experience this possible disaster. And if Bush thinks that he can go house to house fighting the Iraqi people, he has lost the meaning of reality!
So the Iraqis aren't innocents but militia soldiers that would be legimate targets in the course of the war. So much for being innocent 'noncombattants'. Goes to show the depths of Saddam's deparavity as there's no way that the Iraqis match the professionalism of the American army. No doubt the Iraqis would bravely defend their homes but they'll be quickly wiped out.
In any case, it's Khoshnaw who's fantasizing. The Americans won't charge into Baghdad and let Saddam sucker them into fighting a mega-Jenin or even a 1945 Berlin style war. The Americans will undoutedly use their UAVs to full effect as well as pinpoint thermobarbic strikes and fight the Baghdadians according to American military doctrine PERIOD. Unlike Saddam, the Baghdadians won't have nice reinforced concrete bunkers buried deep underground to hide and I don't see them dying for Saddam à la Volksstrum.
Finally he hasn't made the case why the sanctions should be lifted. To state it coldly why does Iraq derserve to have the sanctions lifted if its leadership has never, ever complied with the ceasefire agreements and brazenly violated them? In fact, just this week, the Iraqi leadership has unilaterally declared the inspections to be over and the world is supposed to believe those liars that they have no weapons of mass destruction
Lately, I've been reading in many blogs that America saved Europe in World War I. I challenge the recieved ideas on this subject.
It's hard to accept the assertion that America saved Europe in the First World War. In fact, America rigidly maintained its neutrality in public; while in private it was supplying the British and French with war matériel. To be sure, the American administration defended its trade under the then current international law which allows neutrals to trade with whom it wants even belligerents. That may been a reasonable position until the Napeloenic wars. Since then, and which industrialization has only accentuated, any neutral country that trades with a belligerant has objectively picked side in a conflict and must be treated as a abetter. The reasoning is stark in its simplicity: the neutral supplies the 'enemy' with vital resources with which to prolong a conflict and thus tilt the balance of forces against the other combatant.
Consequently, I disagree with John Weider's contention that American defenselessness encouraged the Germans to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare. Rather, it was a realization by the Germans admirals that the most effective strategy to win the war was to interdict the shipping lanes and thereby starve England to submission. The strategy was applied haltingly because as men of their time, they felt bound by the 1888 Law of the Mercantile Marine which spelled out how to attack and when merchant shipping. However, as it became clear that the war would be a long affair, the German admirals adopted unrestricted submarine warfare.
When the Americans finally declare war and arrived at teh Western Front, their contribution was to tilt decisively the balance of forces overwhelminly in the Allies' favour. The Germans had exhausted all of its human and matrial resources and simply could never counter the fresh infusion of the American contribution. Yet the Americans really didn't save Europe from the First World War and even managed to lose the peace with the help from the French, Belgs and British.
It's too easy to blame Wilson alone for the subsequent loss of the peace. The French, Belgs and British also deserve much of the blame. My history professor, in my university days, pointed to the class that the leaders gathered at Versailles had read their history of the 1815 Vienna Conference and tried to imitate its results for a lasting peace. It failed. It failed because the French, Belgians and British negoitators obviously didn't learn the central lessons of the Vienna Conference. France wasn't humilated with war guilt for having started the Revolution which led to the Napoleonic wars or economically crippled by occupation of its industrial areas nor by payment of ludicrious reparations. France was rehabilitated and brought back to the European mainstrean ('the community of nations' to use the contemporary conceit. The french, Beligians and British forgot, or ignored, the lessons and were bent on revenge. The result was political instability and economic chaos of a major European power that wasn't only intolerable, because it would lead to Naziism but because Germany played a stabilizing role in pre-war Central Europe. By destabilizing Germany, weak democracies or authoritarian regime would predominate. British, Belgian and French revanchisme doesn't absolve Wilson's responsibilities.
Wilson's Fourteen points were aimed directly at destroying teh AUstroHungarian empire. He succeeded beyond his expectations. Unfortuately, Wilson, like the other victorous political leaders, didn't offer any succeeding institution or framework, like a common market or a custom union. The result were weak states with small economies with unstable political institutions. Congruent with Germany's internationally sanctioned instability, there was no way the Central Europe would ever be stable, peaceful and prosperous under such conditions.
Wilson's Fourteen points also exposes a latent anti-imperialism that soon became American policy right up to Truman. Anti-imperialism suits the American political and ideological temperment for democracy, free markets and individual liberties. Nevertheless, Wilson confused the Austrian-Hungarian empire with imperialism and never wanted to realize that however creaky and rickety the AustroHungarian empire was, the fact that it lasted so long suggested that it provided much needed stability to a turbulent region; as events in the inter-war years subsequently demonstrated.
Aziz has posted an article that I respectfully disagree with.
In the years, I've listen to Radio Catholic Answers, I've never heard the assertion that people who's born in a different religion is in actuality a Christian and reverts when he or she becomes, say Catholic.
I disagree with Aziz assertion that Christanity (like Islam) is quite explicity about the damned state of the non-believer. As Mark Shea made clear in his article about Abe Zelmanowitz we humans don't know what outside the Church is. Even though Abe didn't believe in Jesus, his action showed that Abe maybe was influenced by him because the former lived by God's Talmudic commandments and died illustrating one of Jesus' promises that there's no better person than one who sacrifices himself so that another may live. It's paradoxical but Abe illustrates what Christians have meant by God works in mysterious ways cliché. So far from condemning a 'non-believer's' 'damned state'(a pious Jew who didn't believe in Jesus is God), we'd wiser to ponder the wonder of God's love that all children of Abraham believe and praise everyday.
Another disagreement I have is when he calls Jews and Christians cousins in the Faith. That's a moving sentiment and I hope that we can indeed view each other in that way very soon but he'll forgive my skepticism. No, I don't mean the usual litany about the imposition of Shar'ia law in Nigeria, nor the forceful conversions in Indonesia nor even the vitriolic Friday sermons at various Mideast mosques; rather, my skepticism is over a banal issue: how come the Copts (and other Mideast Christians) can't renovate their churches or build new ones? How come they face a multitude of societal disqualifications and harassment all derived from the dhimmitude?
I'll repeat a comment I made at Charles Johnson's site. To me, if Islam really viewed the Jews and Christians as cousins of the faith and had more self-confidence, the Moslem countries would allow the former to flourish in ordinary ways like restoring old churches/synagogues, participating fully in society and prosper according to their talents and inclinations. The fact that most Moslem states don't, suggests a deep, unconscious fear of inadequacy. The fear is that if the Christians and Jews were allowed to flourish, some Moselms might be induced to convert or ask troublesome questions of how come the other people of the book seem to be more prosperous, better educated, freer and more productive than the Islamic 'cousins of the faith.'